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EXPANSIVE READING OF PROPERTY CLAUSE
UPHELD
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PROPERTY CLAUSE: The Eighth
Circuit upholds congressional power to control the use of motorboats
and snowmobiles within areas owned by Minnesota but regulated by
the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act as a constitutional
extension of the property clause. State of Minnesota by Alexander
v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981).
INTRODUCTION
Superior National Forest in the north central United States contains an
area known as the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness (BWCAW).
This area is remarkable for its stands of virgin forest and more than 1,000
lakes connected by streams and short portages .' The BWCAW served as
the highway system for America's Woodland Indians and it remains a
water-lover's paradise. The State of Minnesota and the federal government have long sought to protect and preserve this unique area.' The
Canadian government has also acted to preserve the area by designating
the region which complements and extends the BWCAW as Quetico
Provincial Park.
Congress enacted the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of
1978 (BWCAW Act)3 to safeguard this land further. Congress explained
its rationale for the BWCAW Act:
(1) [to] provide for the protection and management of the wilderness so as to enhance public enjoyment and appreciation of the
unique biotic resources of the region,
(2) [to] protect and enhance the natural values and environmental
quality of the lakes, streams, shorelines and associated forest areas
of the wilderness,
(3) [to] maintain high water quality in such areas,
(4) [to] minimize to the maximum extent possible the environmental impacts associated with mineral development affecting such
areas,
(5) [to] prevent further road and commercial development,
(6) [to] provide for the orderly and equitable transition from motorized recreational uses to non-motorized recreational uses on those
lakes, streams and portages . . . where such mechanized uses are to
be phased out. . .. '
Prohibiting the use of recreational motor vehicles on land and water
1. State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1245 (8th Cir. 1981).
2. The federal government first acted in 1902 to reserve forest land in the area and in 1909
proclaimed the one million acre area the Superior National Forest. Id.
3. BWCAW Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1649 (1978).
4. Id.
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was the primary tool which Congress planned to use in carrying out these
stated goals.' The BWCAW Act was consistent with the policy Congress
has followed since passing the Wilderness Act of 1964. That Act stated,
"it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress to secure for the
American people of present and future generations the benefit of an
enduring resource of wilderness. "6 The BWCAW Act provided a blueprint
for the gradual termination of motor vehicles from the BWCAW.
The BWCAW Act immediately created a controversy. Critics objected
in particular to Section 4, which strictly limits the use of motor boats
within the BWCAW and restricts the use of snowmobiles to two designated
trails. 7 Private individuals, the state of Minnesota, and the National Association of Property Owners (NAPO) brought suit against the United
States to have the Act declared unconstitutional .8 The plaintiffs contended
that the Act violated the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution by illegally
extending congressional power. 9 Plaintiffs and defendants filed motions
and cross motions for summary judgment. The United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied that of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed. 10
PROPERTY CLAUSE
Background
Apportioning power between the states and the federal government has
created conflicts since the first days of the republic. The founding fathers
sought to preserve state sovereignty and local government, yet they recognized the need for a detached federal government to arbitrate disputes
5. 123 CONG. REC. H621 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Fraser, who introduced
the Act).
6. Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131a (1964).
7. Section 4(e) permits the use of snowmobiles only until January 1964. BWCAW Act of 1978
Pub. L. No. 95-495, §(e), 92 Stat. 1649, 1650-52 (1978). The Act designates quotas of motorized
craft for each of the lakes, limits the horsepower and speed of the boats, and provides dates for
either termination or reassessment of these uses. Id.
8. The Eighth Circuit consolidated these three cases. In the first and most important case,
Minnesota, NAPO, and other individuals challenged the government's right to legislate over lands
it does not own. This case was originally filed in United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. Plaintiffs dismissed it without prejudice after Judge Harold Greene denied their motion
for a temporary restraining order. Plaintiffs refiled their action in United States District Court in
Minnesota. The second case consolidated the other two lawsuits filed by NAPO against the United
States and against the Secretary of Agriculture. In the second case, the plaintiffs complained that
the Act constituted an unconstitutional "taking" of property under the Fifth Amendment, and that
it was an unconstitutional delegation of power to an individual (the Secretary). The second case also
involved a challenge that the Act conflicted with Canadian-United States treaties and thus must fall.
The court easily and quickly laid all the issues in the second case to rest. This article will concentrate,
as did the court, on the first case.
9. The Tenth Amendment provides that "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people." U.S. Const. Amend. X.
10. National Association of Property Owners v. U.S., 499 F. Supp. 1223 (D.Minn. 1980).
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between the states and to guide foreign policy. " The Articles of Confederation failed in large part because they did not allocate sufficient power
to the central government. 12 In an effort to strike a more successful balance
of power, the drafters of the Constitution extended Congress' power. One
such extension is the Property Clause in Article 4, which states that "[tihe
Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States." 3 The states and Congress have disagreed over the interpretation of this clause. State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block 4 is a
classic illustration of that controversy.
Judicial Interpretationof the Property Clause
The Supreme Court has given the Property Clause both broad and
narrow interpretations, depending on the active or passive role its members believe is proper for Congress. An early case in which the clause
was broadly interpreted is Camfield v. United States."' In Camfield, two
individuals owning alternating sections of land in a checkerboard area
built a square fence enclosing both their sections and sections owned by
the government. They therefore had the exclusive use of their own land,
and the government's land. The portions of the fence along the government land were several inches over the boundary and on private land.
The fence thus enclosed the entire area, but did not touch government
property. The government, however, sued in equity to have the fence
removed. The plaintiff argued that the government could not use the
Property Clause to force him to remove the fence because it was all on
private property. He further contended that the government's power could
not extend even a few inches over the boundary onto private property to
regulate his fence-building.
These arguments did not persuade the Court. Mr. Justice Brown asserted that one man may not do something on his own private land
constituting a nuisance to adjoining property owners. 6 The Court stressed
that the government has the same rights as any individual with respect
to its property. The government may maintain possession, eject trespassers, and object to its neighbors' nuisances. The Court held that the
fence was an illegal encroachment on government land and a nuisance,
and ordered its removal. The court relied on the Property Clause for the
proposition that Congress' police power over its own lands is not subject
to any distinct limitations or boundaries.' 7 The Court found that suing
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 117-35 (5th ed. 1976).
Id.
U.S. Const. art. 4, § 3, cl. 2.
660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981).
167 U.S. 518 (1897).
Id. at 523-24.
Id. at 524-26.
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Camfield to remove his fence was a valid exercise of Congress' power,
stating that any other interpretation would make a mockery of congressional power under the Property Clause.
Recent cases follow this broad interpretation of the Property Clause.
In Kleppe v. New Mexico, 8 the Supreme Court was asked to decide
whether congressional regulations aimed at protecting wild burros and
horses could be sustained 9under the clause as a "needful" regulation
"respecting" public lands. The state of New Mexico and private individuals argued that the Property Clause must be interpreted literally as
power over property only, not power over animals on the property. The
court, however, construed the Clause broadly, noting that "the power
over the public lands thus entrusted to Congress [in the Constitution] is
without limitation." 2" In effect, the Court found that Congress was selfregulating because "the Clause ...gives Congress the power to determine what are 'needful' rules 'respecting' the public lands." 2' The Court,
citing Camfield, held that regulations respecting animals on the public
lands were both appropriate and valid, as Congress was both a proprietor
and a legislator over the public domain.
In United States v. Brown,22 the Eighth Circuit further extended and
clarified congressional power under the Property Clause. Brown involved
a national park in Minnesota in which Congress had forbidden the carrying
of firearms and hunting. Carl Brown was convicted for possession of
firearms in the park. He appealed his conviction, and Minnesota participated as amicus curiae. Minnesota and Brown argued that the federal
government could only prevent hunting on the land owned exclusively
by the federal government and that the restrictions were illegal as applied
to the portions of the national park retained by the state. The court
disagreed and held that the Property Clause supported the government's
restrictions.23
The hunter in Brown had never entered federal land; he had entered
the park from state-owned land and had been hunting on a state-owned
lake when arrested. The court reasoned that the Property Clause empowered Congress to regulate lands not federally owned to protect nearby
18. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
19. Id. at 535. Plaintiffs challenged the validity of the Wild Freeroaming Horses and Burros Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1970 & Supp. IV 1980). The Act required the cooperation of the State
with the Secretary of Agriculture in protecting the animals. New Mexico at first complied with the
Act, but soon balked, as did individual ranchers in the state.
20. 426 U.S. at 539.
21. Id.
22. 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 43 U.S. 949 (1977).
23. The Court reasoned that because the state had cooperated and actively participated in the
creation and designation of the Voyageur National Park with knowledge of Congress' clear intent
to prohibit firearms and hunting, it could not now be heard to complain about these prohibitions.
The Court found that the regulations could be sustained either under this reasoning, or under the
Property Clause. Id. at 820-22.
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federal lands. The critical question for the Brown court was not who
owned the land, but "whether federal regulations can be deemed 'needful'
prescriptions 'respecting' the public lands." 24
The Eighth Circuit found that duck hunting on lands immediately adjacent to national parks presented potential dangers and unwarranted intrusions onto public lands, injuries to park users, and disruptions of
wildlife migration patterns. The court thus found the prohibitions against
firearms and hunting to be valid regulations "designed to promote the
purposes of the federal lands within the national park." 2"
This line of cases indicates that the Property Clause sustains a regulation
or Act when Congress can show a nexus between the challenged regulation
and a policy designed to protect or enhance the public welfare. This
interpretation is not iron-clad, however. The Supreme Court has also
more narrowly construed the Property Clause.
The leading case for the narrow interpretation is Kansas v. Colorado.26
This case concerned a dispute between the two states over the use of the
Arkansas River. Kansas complained that Colorado was taking more than
its fair share of water, to the detriment of Kansas farmers. The federal
government attempted to intervene, asserting that its power over the
reclamation of arid lands in these states gave it the right to apportion the
river's waters. The Supreme Court rejected the attempts to intervene,
holding that the government had no power under the Property Clause to
join a dispute between these states.
The Court recognized that the Constitution is not to be construed narrowly or technically, but it stated that the Constitution does not grant
Congress legislative control over the states. 27 The Court found that the
Tenth Amendment was controlling. It further stated that the Constitution
had not granted to the federal government the power to arbitrate disputes
over water and therefore the power remained with the states or the people .28
The Court refused to allow the United States to enter the dispute, even
via the Property Clause. It held that the United States could intercede
only so far as to preserve or improve the navigability of the Arkansas
River, a power enumerated and granted to it in the Constitution. 29
The Supreme Court generally interprets the Property Clause broadly
24. Id. at 822.
25. Id. at 822-23. Citing the Tenth Amendment, the court of appeals followed the reasoning in
Kleppe and Camfield that states laws conflicting with valid federal legislation must be overruled.
26. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
27. Id. at 88-90.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 117. The Court found that the power to regulate navigability flowed from Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce. Id. at 86. Article One grants power to Congress over interstate
commerce: "The Congress shall have power . .. to regulate commerce ... among the several
states." U.S. Const. art. I,§ 8,cl.3.
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and allows Congress great liberties in regulating federal lands. The Court
has imposed some limits, however, on congressional power, as in Kansas
v. Colorado.The distance that congressional regulation may extend from
the borders of government land remains unclear.
State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block Supports A Broad
Interpretationof the Property Clause
In State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block,3 ° Minnesota alleged that
the BWCAW Act was unconstitutional because Congress had legislated
over the entire Wilderness Area, part of which was owned by Minnesota.
The state challenged Congress' ability to regulate property owned by the
states as an illegal extension of the Property Clause. The federal government contended that the legislation was a valid exercise of its power,
supported by the Property Clause and numerous decisions of the United
States Supreme Court.
The state of Minnesota and the private plaintiffs relied heavily on
Kansas v. Colorado. The Eighth Circuit, however, found that the narrow
construction urged by these groups was inappropriate in light of Camfield
and the line of cases following it. The court further noted that the Supreme
Court had greatly limited Kansas v. Colorado and that more recent expansive interpretations were much more on point and persuasive. 3'
The Eighth Circuit in State of Minnesota attempted to "decide the
question left open in Kleppe-the scope of Congress' property clause
power as applied to activity occurring off federal land." 3 2 Following the
line of cases flowing from Camfield, the Eighth Circuit found that Congress clearly has the power to designate federal land for particular purposes, such as wilderness preservation. The court further held that "as
a necessary incident of that power, Congress must have the ability to
insure that these lands be protected against interference with their intended
purposes," even if the protective regulations apply to non-federal land.33
The Eighth Circuit restricted its analysis to whether Congress' motorized use restrictions were reasonably related to the purposes sought in
the creation of the BWCAW.34 The court followed the test enunciated in
Brown and Kleppe: if Congress can show a nexus between the challenged
regulation and a policy designed to protect or enhance the public welfare,
then the regulation or Act can be sustained by the Property Clause.
The court looked to the purposes of the BWCAW Act and noted the
congressional goal of protecting the environmental integrity of the wil30. 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981).
31. Id. at 1249, n. 18. As the court limited Kansas v. Colorado in a footnote, it may prefer to
keep its analysis intact.
32. Id. at 1248.
33. Id. at 1249.
34. The purposes are set forth in the text supra accompanying note 4.
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derness. The Act contains congressional findings that the orderly management of wilderness areas and their preservation necessitates protection
of wilderness environmental systems. 5 The court found that hearings,
testimony, and legislative history provided ample evidence that the use
of motorized vehicles was incompatible with protecting wilderness areas.
The court stated that "Testimony established that the sight, smell and
sound of motorized vehicles seriously marred the wilderness experience
of canoeists, hikers, and skiers and threatened to destroy the integrity of
the wilderness." 36 The Eighth Circuit concluded that congressional restrictions on motorized vehicles were rationally related to its goal of
preserving wilderness areas. The court further found that the preservation
of wilderness areas was in the public interest. Thus, the court held that
the regulations were constitutionally supported by the Property Clause."
CONCLUSION
The holding in State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block is neither a
radical departure from nor a shocking extension of precedent construing
the Property Clause. It reaffirms and strengthens earlier decisions allowing
legislation to impact on non-public lands, provided that Congress can
demonstrate a connection between the regulation and a sound policy which
protects or enhances public welfare. This nexus test is not a difficult one
for Congress to meet, particularly if it has included a purpose section in
the challenged legislation. This case is important because it supports and
encourages congressional action in important and controversial areas such
as environmental protection.
A contrary holding in this case would have spelled disaster for environmentalists and would have seriously reduced Congress' ability to carry
out its policies. Congress needs broad regulatory powers to preserve
wilderness areas. States often challenge wilderness legislation, as they
are more easily swayed by opposing interest groups. Thus, wilderness
protection is most successful as a national policy. Tie decision in State
of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block restricts judicial inquiry in environmental regulation in national parks to whether the regulation is rationally
related to congressional policy. This application of judicial restraint sensibly facilitates wilderness preservation.
JENNIFER PRUETT LOEHR
35. 660 F.2d at 1251.
36. Id.
37. The court further held that the Act did not contravene the Tenth Amendment, that it was not
an illegal "taking" of property, under the Fifth Amendment, that it did not violate treaties regarding
regulation of waters along international boundaries, and that it was not invalid for failure to file an
environmental impact statement. Id. at 1253-59.

